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Housing wealth inequalities across occupational classes: a comparison of European housing 
wealth accumulation regimes 
 
Barend Wind*, Philipp Lersch**, Caroline Dewilde* 
* Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, the Netherlands 
** Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Cologne, Germany 
 
Abstract: Housing wealth is currently the largest source of wealth for many households, but we know 
little about the distribution of housing wealth, or about the mechanisms through which it reinforces or 
mitigates other inequalities. This is surprising, since recent research assumes that homeownership is 
increasingly central to our understanding of how welfare states redistribute life chances. Government-
sponsored homeownership expansion programs, and housing finance liberalisation have influenced the 
distribution of housing wealth. This paper describes housing wealth inequality outcomes for two birth 
cohorts aged 50 years or over, grouped according to occupational class background. The analysis is 
conducted across 16 European countries with divergent welfare states and housing finance systems, 
using the fourth wave of the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) (2011/2012). 
Our results suggest that the expansion of homeownership has partially reduced tenure inequalities 
between different occupational classes. However, we find that rising homeownership rates have also 
resulted in more unequal distributions of housing wealth, as an increasing number of ‘marginal’ owners 
are drawn into the edges of homeownership. Such a pattern is typical of housing wealth accumulation 
regimes with a market-based provision of housing, but not of regimes with a less marketised system of 
housing provision. 
 
Keywords: homeownership, housing wealth, SHARE, stratification, welfare state.  
 
Introduction 
Between the end of World War II (WWII) and the first decade of the 21st century, two major trends 
in European housing systems have influenced the accumulation and distribution of housing wealth, 
namely (1) the expansion of homeownership and (2) the liberalisation of housing finance. From the 
1960’s onwards, homeownership rates increased in many Western-European welfare states. This 
expansion of homeownership was caused by the influx of younger households with middle and lower 
incomes, in particular from lower occupational classes (Angelini, Laferrère, & Weber, 2013). Many 
European welfare states promoted homeownership, e.g. through  earmarked housing saving schemes 
or privatisation of social housing (Atterhög & Song, 2009; Forrest & Murie, 1988)..  
Since the 1980’s, further increases in homeownership followed the liberalisation of housing finance. 
Mortgage securitisation and eased capital restrictions led to increasing loan-to-income ratios and 
loan-to-value ratios, which allowed more low-income households to enter this tenure. There is 
however large international variation in the organisation of mortgage markets. As a result of 
divergent expansion and liberalisation policies, homeownership rates vastly differ between 
European countries. In 2011, 71% of Europeans lived in homeownership (Eurostat, 2013). The 
lowest rate is found in Switzerland (43%), the highest in Estonia (96%). Since the 1980’s, 
homeownership rates have increased by at least ten percentage points in almost all countries (Dol & 
Haffner, 2010).  At the same time, the liberalisation of housing finance is believed to have led to 
increasing housing consumption, house price inflation and more volatile house price developments 
(OECD, 2014b). Rising house prices impact on housing wealth inequality by (1) generating capital 
gains (losses) for housing market insiders who bought at the right (wrong) location at the right 
(wrong) time, and (2) more restricted access to homeownership for lower occupational classes due 
to higher housing costs. To better understand the partly conflicting results of expansion and 
liberalisation processes for different social groups, we address the following research question: How 
is housing wealth distributed over occupational classes across European countries, and how did this 
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distribution change between two birth cohorts of homeowners that were differently affected by 
expansion and liberalisation? 
 We argue that with the expansion of homeownership and the liberalisation of housing 
finance, two ‘edges of homeownership’ have shifted. The first edge we identify is the boundary 
between tenants and homeowners. In the past, it may have been sufficient to look at the expansion 
of homeownership to middle and lower social classes to investigate a ‘shifting edge of 
homeownership’. With the proliferation and diversification of homeownership, the first edge 
arguably became more diffuse. Homeownership in lower occupational classes is more precarious 
than ‘mainstream homeownership’, however. Such homeowners are found to accumulate less 
housing wealth (i.e. have larger debts), fall out of this tenure more often and own houses of lower 
quality (Smith, Searle, & Cook, 2009).  Thus, it is not tenure status as such, but housing wealth that 
better captures one’s socio-economic position. Therefore, it is increasingly important to look at a 
second edge of homeownership. The second edge of homeownership represents the boundary 
between homeowners with different amounts of housing wealth, in particular in later life. The most 
extreme case can be found when advanced mortgage products, like interest-only mortgages allow 
people to acquire property rights without actually accumulation housing wealth. 
 This paper investigates the net housing wealth distribution of two birth cohorts in 16 
European countries, in order to assess how these edges have shifted, became more diffused and how 
consequent inequalities evolved over time. Net housing wealth is defined as the current market value 
of a dwelling (as indicated by the owner), minus outstanding residential debts. We focus upon two 
birth cohorts (1930 – 1949 / 1950 – 1962) because they bought their first home generally in a 
different period with different homeownership expansion policies (further discussed below). We 
reflect on the first edge of homeownership by showing changes in homeownership rates for 
occupational classes between the two cohorts. Furthermore, we shed light on the second edge of 
homeownership by investigating changes in the distribution of housing wealth across homeowners 
in different occupational classes between both birth cohorts. 
 This research advances previous studies in three ways. First, it advances studies on wealth 
inequalities (Engelhardt & Kumar, 2011; Semyonov & Lewin-Epstein, 2013; Spilerman, 2000). In 
these studies, housing wealth is seldom taken into account separately, whereas it has different 
drivers than financial wealth. Second, it advances studies that investigated inequalities in access to 
homeownership and housing outcomes (Dewilde & Lancee, 2013). Instead of looking at inequalities 
between tenants and homeowners, this paper focuses on inequalities in housing wealth. It adds an 
important dimension to the study of housing-related inequalities. Third, it generates a new 
international-comparative perspective on the role of housing wealth instead of tenure choices across 
occupational classes by examining differences across clusters of 16 European countries (Kurz, 2004). 
 
Housing wealth and stratification 
Wealth and labour market income are separate dimensions of socio-economic stratification 
(Spilerman, 2000). We focus on housing wealth (separately from financial wealth), since it is unique 
in two important ways. First, contrary to financial wealth, it is possible to enjoy this form of wealth 
at the same time as it is accumulated. Second, homeownership is strongly promoted by governments, 
which has a profound effect on its distribution compared to financial wealth. 
 
Housing wealth accumulation 
Housing wealth is accumulated over the life course (Cowell, Karagiannaki, & McKnight, 2012). This 
accumulation process starts with the decision to become a homeowner. Partnership formation and 
parenthood are related to the entry into homeownership, while, for example, divorce or 
unemployment may lead to exits (Mulder & Wagner, 1998). For those who entered homeownership, 
initial housing wealth is determined by the purchase price in relation to the down-payment and the 
size of the mortgage. High down-payments can function as a barrier to enter homeownership but also 
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lead to an initial stock of housing wealth. Easy access to credit can foster entry into homeownership 
without this initial stock. Third, housing wealth is shaped by the mortgage terms that determine how 
much capital is accumulated. Fourth, capital gains and losses reflected in the difference between the 
initial purchase price and the current market value of the house affect housing wealth. The latter is 
determined by current housing market dynamics.  
 
Housing wealth distribution 
Standard analyses of wealth seldom focus on the role of housing wealth in socio-economic 
stratification.  Appleyard and Rowlingson (2010) study housing wealth in isolation and conclude that 
the housing wealth distribution in the United Kingdom (UK) is more equal than the financial wealth 
distribution (also see Davies and Shorrocks (2000)). However, their analysis does not show how 
housing wealth adds to other socio-economic inequalities. In this paper, we therefore investigate 
housing wealth holdings across occupational classes. This is important, as different occupational 
classes are distinctively affected by government policies. For example, the expansion of 
homeownership was directed towards middle and lower classes. Furthermore, different drivers of 
housing wealth can be dominant in particular occupational classes, e.g. self-help is dominant for 
skilled manual workers in rural areas of corporatist welfare states with a stronger focus on family 
networks (Kurz, 2004). 
 
A changing housing wealth distribution 
The distribution of housing wealth across occupational classes develops over time, due to housing 
market dynamics and government interventions. By analysing housing wealth of occupational classes 
in two cohorts that are differently affected by these changes, we try to show how homeownership 
expansion and housing finance liberalisation policies play out across the class structure. We expect 
differences between cohorts because of two reasons. First, different cohorts have been subjected to 
different housing policies, since the preferences of governments shifted over time. In times of 
homeownership expansion, more lower- and middle-class households are able to make the step into 
homeownership. Second, capital gains and losses are based on time and location. Hamnett (1999) 
and Burbidge (1998) find for the UK and Australia that lower-class homeowners faced lower capital 
gains than higher-class owners during the liberalisation of housing finance. As we are unable to 
disentangle cohort and period effects in our analysis, we discuss our results as cohort differences 
that are substantially shaped by cumulative period effects during respondents’ life courses. Previous 
analyses of the SHARELIFE-data have shown that in most countries, there are few residential moves 
after age 50 (Angelini, Brugiavini, & Weber, 2011). This implies that age-effects caused by the 
transformation of housing wealth into financial wealth (e.g. by down-sizing or exiting 
homeownership) affect our results only marginally. 
 
Housing wealth accumulation regimes 
Housing wealth trajectories are shaped through the interaction between life courses and institutional 
factors. We refer to this interaction as housing wealth accumulation regimes, resulting in 
international variations in the distribution of housing wealth between occupational classes. Housing 
wealth accumulation regimes determine which social groups have access to homeownership (at 
which age), how they finance it, for which price they buy their dwelling and to what extent they 
experience capital gains and losses. Homeownership expansion and housing finance liberalisation 
policies are the main institutional arrangements of housing wealth accumulation regimes. 
 In this study, we identify five housing wealth accumulation regimes, based on their 
homeownership expansion and housing finance regulation policies. Homeownership expansion is 
measured on the basis of (1) homeownership rates in 1980 and (2) their development until 2008 
(see Table 1). In the earlier period, expansion is mainly driven by state-sponsored promotion 
following WWII (e.g. demand subsidies, mortgage-interest tax deductions and housing grants). In the 
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second period, expansion is caused by a combination of the liberalisation of housing finance and the 
before-mentioned promotion programmes. Housing finance regulations are reviewed to distinguish 
between state- and liberalisation-driven expansion of homeownership. The latter is indicated by 
average-loan-to-income ratios, and loan maturities (see Table 1). The higher loan-to-value ratios, and 
the longer loan maturities, the easier the availability of mortgage finance. Loosening housing finance 
regulations are part of economic globalisation, but are also deliberately used by governments to 
enable younger (lower- and middle-class) households to enter homeownership (Angelini et al., 
2013). Although our focus lies with housing (finance) policies, other welfare state arrangements also 
matter. Income protection and redistribution equalise chances in the housing market, and therefore 
lead to smaller differences between occupational classes in terms of homeownership and housing 
wealth.  Furthermore, a lack of old-age arrangements in the form of pensions, can contribute to higher 
homeownership rates. Outright ownership functions as a piggybank, which generates low monthly 
fixed housing costs (Castles, 1998; Kemeny, 1981). We expect that as a consequence of difference 
policy preferences, the first and the second edge of homeownership have a different nature in the 











value (2005 - 2010) 
Loan maturity in years 
(2005 - 2010) 
Developing Mediterranean Italy 59% +10 55 - 80%** 5-20 
  Spain 73% +12 80 - 100%** 15-20 
  Portugal 52% +24 80 - 90% 30-40 
Developing privatisation Estonia 26% +70 70-75% Up to 30 
  Hungary 71% +21 70% 5-35 
  Poland 36% +51 80 - 100% 5-32,5 
  Slovenia 69% +23 50%* 10 
Restricted rental Germany 30% +13 70 - 80%* 20-30 
  Switzerland 30% +13 65% 15-20 
  Austria 52% +4 70 -85%* 25 
  Czech 53% +11 70 - 85%* 20 
Regulated expansion Belgium 59% +9 80 - 90% 20 
  France 47% +10 66 - 100% 15-20 
Liberal expansion Denmark 56% -3 80% 30 
  Sweden 58% -2 85 - 95% 30-45 
  Netherlands 42% +16 95 - 100%** 30 
     * = Bausparen important element of finance 
        
** = RMBS important element of housing 
finance 
Table 1: Overview of housing wealth accumulation regimes. Source: (Brown, 2005; Dol & Haffner, 2010; Drudi et 
al., 2009; EC, 2014; EMF, 2007, 2013; Hess & Holzhausen, 2008; HFN, 2014; Hilbers, Banerji, Shi, & Hoffmaister, 
2008; OECD, 2014a; Queisser & Whitehouse, 2005; Standard&Poor's, 2002; Swedbank, 2012). 
 
The developing Mediterranean regime (Italy, Spain and Portugal) shows a strong and early 
expansion of homeownership and a developing mortgage market. Especially in Spain, 
homeownership has become almost universal. However, 1980 homeownership rates do not differ 
much from those in Belgium and France at that moment. The Mediterranean countries are classified 
as a separate regime, since the role of the family in the allocation of housing is more important than 
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in other regimes. In these countries, a rental sector is lacking (Mulder & Billari, 2010), and housing 
finance is not widely available. Loan-to-value ratios are moderate, but mortgage terms largely differ 
between individuals. In the decades after WWII, homeownership expanded due to the privatisation 
of social housing (Donner, 2000), and later because governments tolerated illegal self-construction 
(Allen, 2006). Since the 1980s, illegal construction became less tolerated and the privatisation of 
social housing came to an end. In Spain and Portugal, loans became slightly more accepted, but 
especially in Italy, intra-family transfers constitute an important source of obtaining homeownership 
(Mulder & Billari, 2010). We expect relatively small tenure inequalities between occupational classes 
in the developing Mediterranean regime, because of the large and early expansion of homeownership 
in these countries. We envisage two possible consequences of these small tenure inequalities for the 
distribution of housing wealth. First, we expect that housing wealth becomes more unequally 
distributed when homeownership rates increase. Lower occupational classes are only able to enter 
homeownership when they take out loans, select themselves into less popular locations or lower-
quality dwellings, which lowers their housing wealth and enlarges their relative distance to higher 
occupational classes. Second, the family as housing allocation mechanism is expected to reduce 
housing wealth inequalities. The labour market income of the household is arguably a less important 
predictor of housing consumption when families build their own houses on collective lands.   
 The developing privatisation regime consists of post-socialist countries (Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovenia) and has a high (but late) expansion of homeownership and a developing 
mortgage market. With homeownership rates close to 100% in 2008, owner-occupancy has 
expanded even more than in the developing Mediterranean regime. Short loan maturities and large 
individual variation in loan terms indicate a developing housing finance system. Loans are seldom 
used to finance homeownership. Only very recently, lending criteria in Estonia and Poland are 
somewhat eased (Bohle, 2013). The post-socialist countries are classified in a different regime than 
the Southern European welfare states, since the timing of the expansion of homeownership differs. 
In the developing privatisation regime, homeownership rates rose since the 1990’s, when a majority 
of the population could acquire homeownership via ‘give-away’ privatisation schemes. The impact of 
these schemes differs between the southern and the northern countries in this regime, since the 
southern countries of Slovenia and Hungary have a longer tradition of homeownership under 
communism (Andrusz, Harloe, & Szelényi, 2008). Since the fall of communism, the housing market 
has been neglected by the state and the market. Housing finance is only limitedly available and semi- 
or illegal self-construction was accepted in the transition period. This increased the role of the family 
as allocation mechanism for housing (Remmert, Hegedűs, & Tosics, 2001; Stephens, Lux, & Sunega, 
2015). We expect small tenure inequalities between occupational classes in this regime, and small 
differences between the two birth cohorts, even though homeownership rates were far lower when 
the oldest birth cohort entered the housing market (under communism). The high (close to 100%) 
2008 homeownership rates indicate that households from all cohorts bought their state-owned 
rental dwelling for give-away prices after the fall of the Iron Curtain. We expect housing wealth 
inequalities to be smaller in the oldest cohort than in the youngest cohort. For members of the oldest 
cohort, who obtained the homes they bought in later life under communism, we suppose that the link 
between occupational class and housing consumption is weaker than in the youngest cohort because 
loyalty towards the ruling party, instead of labour market income, was decisive in obtaining housing 
until 1990.  
In the restricted rental regime (Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Czech Republic), the 
expansion of homeownership has been limited (homeownership rates between 30 and 50%) and the 
housing finance system is restricted. Low homeownership rates can be explained by two factors. 
First, non-stigmatised rental housing is widely available, and forms an alternative for 
homeownership, even for higher-class households (Bourassa & Hoesli, 2010). Second, the entry into 
homeownership is difficult due to a restricted housing finance system. Table 1 shows that loan-to-
value ratios are low (a large down-payment is needed) and maturities short. The prominence of 
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Bausparen schemes, i.e. long-term saving schemes coupled with attractive loans, underlines the 
conservative orientation of the housing finance system. This financial system delays a move into 
homeownership for many people. The lower classes often never make the move into 
homeownership. Evidence shows that working class households were more likely to enter 
homeownership in the decades after WWII. In that period, self-construction was more common 
(especially in rural areas) due to extensive demand subsidies (Kurz, 2004). Although the Czech 
Republic is a post-socialist country, it is classified in the restricted rental regime due to its low 
homeownership rate and conservative housing finance system. We expect large tenure inequalities 
between occupational classes, due to the low homeownership rates in this regime. Since 
homeownership is most restrictive in this regime, compared to other regimes, we expect the lowest 
net housing wealth inequalities. When homeownership is more restrictive, lower class households 
that enter homeownership do not only use their labour market income to obtain a (smaller) 
mortgage, but other sources as well, like savings and family transfers. Furthermore, the restricted 
housing finance system resulted in stable house price developments, which possibly prevented an 
increase in inequality in housing wealth between occupational classes. Since homeownership rates 
were higher when the youngest birth cohort entered the housing market compared to the oldest 
cohort, we expect larger housing wealth inequalities among the youngest cohort (1950-1961).  
In the regulated expansion regime (Belgium and France), the expansion of homeownership 
continues until the present day, and the housing finance system is regulated. Both countries in this 
regime have promoted homeownership since WWII with targeted schemes for (low-income) 
households in the form of subsidies or tax deductions. An example is the French pret-a-taux-zero 
(interest subsidy) that enables lower-class households to enter homeownership (Donner, 2000). 
Higher homeownership rates are furthermore caused by the less restrictive housing finance system. 
Housing loans are a common way to finance homeownership. However, access is much easier for 
higher income groups (Mulder & Billari, 2010). Since the expansion of homeownership is only slightly 
lower than in the developing Mediterranean regime, we expect comparable, or slightly larger tenure 
inequalities between occupational classes, as individuals are less reliant on the extended family. 
Housing wealth inequalities are expected to be larger among the youngest cohort (1950-1962) than 
among the oldest cohort (1930-1949) due to the mortgage-driven expansion of homeownership. The 
latter allows lower-income households to enter homeownership, but does not necessarily allow them 
to accumulate housing wealth (due to large debts) (Lowe, Searle, & Smith, 2012). 
Finally, the liberal expansion regime consists of Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, where 
the expansion of homeownership is moderate, but the housing finance system fairly deregulated. 
Especially in Denmark and Sweden, homeownership rates in 1980 were relatively high, since their 
governments promoted homeownership in a non-financialised way in the decades after WWII, by 
granting object subsidies to large developers (Hedin, Clark, Lundholm, & Malmberg, 2012). In the 
Netherlands, these funds were channelled into rental housing.  These direct state interventions in the 
housing market were aimed at solving the housing shortage after WWII, and at building an inclusive 
welfare state. Part of the homeownership promotion programs in these countries was a preferential 
fiscal treatment of homeownership in the form of interest tax deductions (Donner, 2000). In 
Denmark and Sweden, homeownership rates did not rise after 1980. Increasing homeownership 
rates in the Netherlands, make the situation in this country in 2008 comparable to the other countries 
in this regime. All three countries abandoned object subsidies in the 1980’s and embraced liberal 
housing finance systems. Table 1 shows that average maturities are 30 to 40 years, and loan-to-value 
ratios exceeding 100% are common. The easy access to credit originates from regulations that allow 
banks to put off risks to third parties. In the Netherlands, Residential Mortgage Backed Securities 
(RMBS) are used, whereas mortgage bonds are common in Denmark. The countries in this regime 
have the highest mortgage debt to GDP ratios in Europe (Schwartz & Seabrooke, 2008). Furthermore, 
there is evidence that the liberalisation of housing finance led to more volatile and inflated house 
prices (OECD, 2014b). We expect that tenure inequalities between occupational classes are larger 
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than in the restricted rental regime, because the social rental sector is especially for the lower and 
middle class an attractive alternative to homeownership. We expect these inequalities to be slightly 
lower among the youngest cohort due to increasing homeownership rates in the Netherlands 
between 1980 and 2008. We expect that the liberalisation of housing finance increases net housing 
wealth inequalities, by allowing households to take out large residential loans. Especially lower class 
households are expected to be unable to amortize their mortgages. Since the liberalisation of housing 
wealth took off since the 1980s, we expect larger housing wealth inequalities, and higher mortgage 
debts among the youngest cohort (1950 – 1962) than among the oldest cohort (1930 – 1949). Capital 
gains and losses as a driver of housing wealth accumulation play an arguably larger role in the liberal 
expansion regime than in the other regimes. Capital gains generate a return on a certain location 
(Hamnett, 1999), and translate into housing wealth inequalities between occupational classes when 
they are spatially segregated.    
 
Data and method 
 
Data 
Our analysis is based on the fourth wave of the Survey of Health and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 
This is an international longitudinal, ex-ante harmonized survey, carried out in 16 countries (Austria, 
Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia and Estonia) in 2011/12. Contact-, cooperation- and 
retention rates are high (around 90, 60 and 50%), but differ considerably between countries (Malter 
& Börsch-Supan, 2013). Information from the second (2006) and the third wave (2008) is used to 
enrich the data from the fourth wave. In this way, we are able to link information from spouses and 
other family members who passed away or dropped out before the fourth wave, to those who 
participated in wave four. The use of the SHARE-data has three major advantages. First, it is one of 
the few international comparative datasets containing information on (housing) wealth. Second, 
SHARE has a large sample size in all 16 countries that are included. In total, 59599 respondents 
participated in wave four, with a minimum of 1623 in Germany, and a maximum of 6828 in Estonia. 
Germany, Poland and Sweden have relatively few participants in this wave, because no refreshment 
sample has been added. The third advantage of the SHARE is that countries belonging to various 
welfare regimes and housing systems are represented. 
 
Sample 
Only one respondent per household is kept in the dataset, as our most important variable is measured 
at the household level. Two sample restrictions are imposed. First, for clarity of presentation, we 
focus on two birth cohorts, 1930–1949 and 1950-1962. Second, female-headed households,  of 
women whose husbands died before wave three, are excluded. It is likely that the occupational status 
of these households will be underestimated as the husbands’ occupational status is often higher than 
the wife’s. These sample restrictions reduce the sample by 20%. 
 
Variables 
Net housing wealth, the variable of main interest, is measured at the household level. Net housing 
wealth is the market value of the first dwelling and potentially a second property (gross housing 
wealth) minus the residential debt. The current market value is derived from self-evaluation by the 
respondent. Previous studies using the same, admittedly subjective measure have proven its 
reliability (Ansell, 2013; Mulder, Dewilde, Van Duijn, & Smits, Forthcoming). Top-coding at the 99.8-
percentile is used to remove outliers. Home-owning households with no information on their housing 
wealth receive a missing value. To facilitate comparisons between countries with different currencies 
and prosperity levels, we calculate net housing wealth as a percentage of the national mean.  
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 Residential debt is included as a separate variable, as one of the drivers of housing wealth. It 
is calculated as percentage of the value of the house, to evaluate the role of housing finance in 
different housing wealth accumulation regimes.    
Occupational class is measured with a four-category classification of occupational class based 
on the ISCO-code, additionally distinguishing the self-employed. Elementary occupations, plant and 
machine operators, and skilled agricultural or fishery workers are classified as ‘low’. Crafts and 
related trade workers, service workers and shopkeepers and clerks are classified as ‘middle’. 
Technicians, associate professionals, professionals and legislators, senior officials and managers are 
classified as ‘high’. The self-employed are treated as a separate category, as they are often less 
protected by welfare arrangements, and the owned home forms part of their means of production 
(Kurz, 2004). For retired, sick or unemployed respondents, information about the last job hold, is 
used. For those who are still working, we use information about the current job. The highest 
occupational class status in the household is allocated to all members, since they are assumed to pool 
resources. 
 Two birth cohorts are distinguished to investigate how the distribution of housing wealth 
across occupational classes developed over time1. The first cohort includes those who were born 
between 1930 and 1949, the second cohort those who are born between 1950 and 1962. We exclude 
respondents who are born after 1962, since they do not belong to the sample of the fourth wave of 
SHARE (aged 50 and older in 2012). We exclude respondents who are born before 1930 because 
their number is too small to add them as a separate cohort. Based on theoretical considerations, we 
split the remaining sample in a cohort born before 1950, and from 1950 onwards. Since the 
liberalisation of housing finance took off in the 1980s, and people in general buy their first house 
before age 35, we can assume that the cohort born before 1950 bought the first dwelling during the 
heydays of the government-sponsored expansion of homeownership, whereas a considerable share 
of the respondents born after 1950, bought after the start of housing finance liberalisation.  
Respondents are assigned to the cohort of the oldest household member (mostly the man). 
 
Methods 
Descriptive statistics are used to map tenure inequalities and housing wealth inequalities among 
occupational classes in an older (1930–1949) and a younger (1950–1962) birth cohort. We report 
the average homeownership rate, net housing wealth holdings relative to the national mean and 
residential debts relative to gross housing wealth holdings for occupational classes pooled in five 
housing wealth accumulation regimes. Homeownership rates indicate how many people are 
eventually able to accumulate housing wealth. Average housing wealth holdings shed light on the 
financial consequences of residing in homeownership. Residential debts in later life, finally, show the 
share of people which has been unable to accumulate housing wealth by entering homeownership. 
The statistical significance of differences between cohorts and occupational classes, and over time, is 
evaluated at the two-sided 90% confidence level. The choice for a 90%-confidence level is justified 
by the argument that change over time is often slow, which makes it harder to detect significance. 
 
Results 
The expansion of homeownership has a different form and timing in our five housing wealth 
accumulation regimes (see Table 1). As a consequence, occupational classes in two cohorts (1930-
1949 and 1950-1962) differ from each other in terms of homeownership rates and housing wealth 
holdings. We discuss the development of tenure and housing wealth inequalities by regime (see Table 
2 in appendix for precise figures). 
                                                   
1 A cohort-comparison to assess developments over time is based on the assumption that occupational 
classes have a similar size and meaning in the two cohorts. The relative size shows little variation over time. 
We assume that the meaning of occupational classes shows larger cross-country than cross-time variation.  
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Figure 1: Homeownership rates of occupational classes in two cohorts, in different housing wealth accumulation 
regimes. Source: Share wave 2,3,4 (own computation).
 
Figure 2: Housing wealth holdings of occupational classes in two cohorts, in different housing wealth 





Figure 3: Residential debts of occupational classes in two cohorts, in different housing wealth accumulation 
regimes. Source: Share wave 2,3,4 (own computation). 
 
Developing Mediterranean regime 
The Southern-European countries in the developing Mediterranean regime have a long tradition of 
homeownership due to lack of rental housing and widespread self-construction. The large and early 
expansion of homeownership (see Table 1) has translated into smaller tenure inequalities across 
occupational classes than in all other regimes. The homeownership rate among the lowest class in 
the 1930-1949 birth cohort is 85%, whereas it is 94% for the highest class in this cohort (see Figure 
1(a)). Whereas overall homeownership rates increase between 1980 and 2008 (Table 1), our results 
suggest that homeownership rates dropped significantly between cohorts for the lowest 
occupational class. Figure 1(a) shows that only 77% own a home in the 1950-1962 birth cohort 
(compare with 85% in the oldest cohort). We point at three possible explanations. First, the working-
class housing strategy of self-construction became less accepted over time (Allen, 2006). Second, 
housing finance was not available to fill this gap (Mulder & Billari, 2010). Three, access to a secure 
labour market position has become increasingly difficult for young people in these countries, 
resulting in later ages of nest-leaving (Aassve, Billari, & Ongaro, 2001) 
 Housing wealth inequalities are more pronounced than tenure inequalities. As shown in 
Figure 1(b), net housing wealth holdings of the lowest class in the 1930-1949 cohort are 69% of the 
national mean, whereas housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational class in this cohort are 
126%. Only the position of the lower class and the self-employed change when the two cohorts are 
compared. The lower class in the 1950-1962 cohort increases its position with 18 percentage points 
to 87% of the national mean, whereas the position of the self-employed deteriorates (see Figure 
1(b)). The increasing housing wealth holdings of the lowest occupational class are associated with 
decreasing homeownership rates. This indicates that the lower-class respondents entering 
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homeownership may have become increasingly selective over time, likely in terms of the type of 
housing (higher value) and perhaps also in terms of the resources they brought with them in the first 
place. Although residential debts are generally very small, they display a steep rise when the oldest 
cohort is compared with the youngest cohort. 
 
Developing privatisation regime 
The universality of homeownership in the post-communist countries translates into high 
homeownership rates among all occupational classes in both cohorts. Figure 1(a) shows that 73% of 
the lower-class households in the 1930-1949 birth cohort are homeowners, whereas 86% of the 
higher-class households in this cohort lives in an owned home. When the younger and the older birth 
cohort are compared, homeownership rates increased with five percentage points to 83% for the 
middle class, and with six percentage points to 92% in the higher class. The self-employed display 
the largest increase, from 65% to 90%. In the transition from a socialist- to a free-market economy, 
the number and social position of entrepreneurs (often part of the old party nomenclatura) increased. 
The higher homeownership rates among the higher class and the self-employed should be 
interpreted as consequence of the privatisation process that  “turned former political power […] into 
a market asset” (Donner, 2006, p. 136). As noted before, the lower occupational groups were not able 
to improve their position to the same extent. 
 The small tenure inequalities in the developing privatisation regime are, especially in the 
oldest cohort, mirrored by small housing wealth inequalities. When the oldest cohort is taken into 
account, tenure differences between the lower- and higher class are smaller than in most other 
regimes (see Figure 1(b)).  In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, which obtained their homes generally 
under communism, housing wealth holdings of the lowest occupational class are 73% of the national 
mean, whereas housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational class are 112% of the national 
mean. When the youngest cohort is compared to the oldest cohort, both the middle and higher class 
improve their position. Figure 1(b) shows that housing wealth holdings of the middle class rise with 
12 percentage points to 108%, and housing wealth holdings of the highest occupational class rise 
with 18 percentage points to 130% of the national mean in the 1950-1962 birth cohort.. Lower-class 
households that entered the housing market after the fall of communism, made a similar tenure 
choice as their higher-class counterparts due to a lack of rental housing.  However, they have not 
been able to accumulate the same amount of housing wealth. The absence of residential debts in both 
cohorts point at the existence of a non-financialised housing market. 
 
Restricted rental regime 
The countries in this regime (Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Czech Republic) have low 
homeownership rates due their unitary rental market with accessible and non-stigmatised (public) 
rental housing (Hoekstra, 2009). Our findings suggest that especially among the lowest occupational 
class, homeownership rates are lower than in any other regime. Figure 1(a) shows that the lowest 
occupational class in the 1930-1949 birth cohort has a homeownership rate of 34%, compared with 
72% for the highest occupational class. The expansion of homeownership has led to higher 
homeownership rates among the middle- and higher class in the 1950-1962 cohort. Homeownership 
rates increased from 58% to 63% for the middle class, and with eight percentage points to 80% for 
the highest class. Increasing tenure inequalities are the result of the slower degree of expansion at 
the beginning of the process, relative to other countries. Therefore, there is potential for expansion 
of homeownership among more wealthy and less risky households. 
 The expectation that the smallest expansion of homeownership co-occurs with the smallest 
housing wealth inequalities, does not hold. In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, the distribution of housing 
wealth does not significantly differ from the developing privatisation regime (except for self-
employed). As shown in Figure 1(b), the housing wealth holdings of the lowest class in the oldest 
cohort are 68% of the national mean, compared to 108% for the highest occupational class. When 
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both cohorts are compared, the middle class in the youngest cohort loses out from 99% to 70% of 
the national mean, the lowest occupational class with eleven percentage points to 57% of the national 
mean. The falling housing wealth holdings for the lower and middle class, are mirrored by an increase 
of mortgage debts. Among the lowest occupational class, residential debts increased from 8% to 22% 
percent of the house value, whereas mortgage debts increased from 3% to 15% among the middle 
class. When the lower and the middle class in the two cohorts are compared, we can conclude that 
the share of homeowners has only slightly increased, and that the average house value between the 
two cohorts does not differ much. We speculate that lower- and middle-class households increasingly 
have been using mortgage debts to keep up their housing consumption in a period of rising relative 
costs of housing (e.g. due to the reduction of self-construction).  
 
Regulated expansion regime 
In this regime (France, Belgium), homeownership is stimulated in a state-market nexus, with 
subsidies and loans, resulting in a similar expansion to the developing Mediterranean regime. Tenure 
inequalities are larger than in the developing Mediterranean regime. In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, 
67% of the households in the lowest occupational class are homeowners, compared to 88% of the 
households in the highest occupational class. When both cohorts are compared, only the middle class 
loses out slightly with five percentage points (from 75% to 80% of the national mean). The upswing 
in overall homeownership rates since 1980 (see Table 1) is likely to have materialised for the 
younger cohorts, which are not included in our analysis sample. 
 Housing wealth inequalities between occupational classes in the 1930-1949 birth cohort are 
larger than in any other regime, which is expected on the basis of a large expansion of 
homeownership. Figure 1(b) shows that housing wealth holdings of a lower-class household in the 
1930-1949 are more than sixty percentage points lower than those of a higher class household 
(respectively 70% and 132% of the national mean). However, the distribution of housing wealth 
becomes more equal in the 1950-1962 cohort. As shown in Figure 1(b), housing wealth holdings of 
the middle class dropped from to 79% (90% in the oldest cohort), and housing wealth holdings of 
the highest occupational class dropped from 132% to 104% of the national mean. The reason behind 
the lower housing wealth holdings of the middle- and higher class are unknown. However, the stable 
position of the lower class seems to be the result of targeted homeownership stimulation and 
protection schemes in these countries, e.g. pret-a-taux-zero schemes. Although mortgages are widely 
used to finance housing, a very large share appears to be paid back in later life. However, when the 
youngest cohort is compared with the oldest cohort, residential debts rise from around 1% to around 
4% (see Figure 1(c)).  
 
Liberal expansion regime 
The countries in this regime (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands) have a non-stigmatized restricted 
rental market, combined with a liberal housing finance regime. Compared to the restricted rental 
regime (with a comparable unitary rental market), homeownership rates are higher among the 
lower- and middle classes (see Figure 1(a)). In the 1930-1949 birth cohort, the homeownership rate 
of the lowest occupational class is 45%, relative to 79% of the highest occupational class. When the 
1950-1962 birth cohort is compared to the 1930-1949 cohort, the lower, middle and high class 
display increasing homeownership rates. The largest increase can be found in the middle class, from 
64% in the oldest cohort to 75% in the youngest cohort. The increase among the lowest occupational 
class is considerable, but has a larger confidence interval. It is worth remarking that the liberal 
expansion regime is the only regime in which homeownership rates increased among the lower class. 
Lower-class households were able to enter homeownership as a result of the liberalisation of housing 
finance, which allowed financial institutions to take larger risks, resulting lower down-payment 
requirements and loan-to-value ratios. 
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 In the liberal expansion regime, net housing wealth is distributed fairly equally across the 
different occupational classes in the oldest birth cohort. Figure 1(b) shows that housing wealth 
holdings of the highest class, are only slightly higher than those of the lowest occupational class 
(respectively 106% and 83% of the national mean). We speculate that this finding originates from 
the non-financialised way in which the (especially Nordic) governments in this regime have 
promoted homeownership in the post-war period. When the two cohorts are compared, especially 
the lower housing wealth holdings of the lowest occupational class, are striking. Their housing wealth 
holdings drop from 83% of the national mean in the 1930-1949 birth cohort, to 52% in the 1950-
1962 cohort. The decreasing housing wealth holdings of the lowest occupational class, are mirrored 
by an increase of residential debts. Mortgage debts are far larger in the liberal expansion regime, than 
in any other. Figure 1(c) shows that residential debts are between 16% and 21% of gross housing 
wealth (the current market value) in the 1930-1949 birth cohort, and between 29% and 43% of the 
gross housing wealth in the 1950-1962 birth cohort. The liberalisation of housing finance allowed 
mortgage debt to penetrate into all occupational classes, although the increase has been much more 
pronounced among the lower class. Lower loan-to-value ratios, and very long loan maturities have 
allowed lower classes to enter homeownership, but have created a new form of inequality in the 
sphere of housing. The large residential debts among the population aged 50 and over imply that for 
many (those with interest-only mortgages) the entire housing wealth is based on capital gains.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we argue that housing wealth is an important dimension of economic stratification. It 
is realized in an accumulation process over the life course within different institutional contexts. The 
interaction between the institutional context and the life course is conceptualized as the housing 
wealth accumulation regime. We distinguish five regimes in which the expansion of homeownership 
has a different timing, origin and intensity. For these regimes, we investigate to what extent 
households from different occupational classes in two birth cohorts (1930-1949 and 1950-1962) are 
able to enter homeownership (tenure inequality), and to what extent they are able to accumulate 
housing wealth if they enter homeownership (housing wealth inequality).  
 Tenure inequalities and housing wealth inequalities interplay differently in the five housing 
wealth accumulation regimes. As a rule of thumb, housing wealth inequalities  among homeowners 
are larger when tenure inequalities are smaller. As the income determines housing consumption, the 
attraction of economically weak households into homeownership results in larger housing wealth 
inequalities between occupational classes.  Although wealth accumulation is generally one of the 
political motives behind the expansion of homeownership, its wealth effects are smaller than 
sometimes assumed. 
 Both a cross-regime comparison of separate cohorts, as a cross-cohort comparison within 
regimes, point at the association between tenure inequality and housing wealth inequality. First, the 
cross-regime comparison can be illustrated by focusing upon the restricted rental regime (Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, Czech Republic), and the regulated expansion regime (Belgium France). 
Countries in both regimes have comparable conservative welfare states. However, their expansion of 
homeownership differs. Especially in the period in which the 1930-1949 birth cohort entered the 
housing market, the expansion of homeownership in the regulated expansion regime was high due 
to housing grants, tax deductions and demand subsidies. In the restricted rental regime, 
homeownership rates among the lower- and middle class are fairly low since non-stigmatised social 
housing forms an attractive alternative. The significantly higher housing wealth holdings of the 
middle class in the restricted rental regime, compared to the regulated expansion regime, shows that 
the diversification in the influx contributes to housing wealth inequalities when mortgage credit has 
a larger role in the expansion of homeownership.  
Second, a cross-cohort comparison of occupational classes confirms the association between 
tenure inequalities and housing wealth inequalities. In the restricted rental regime, increasing 
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homeownership rates among the middle class are mirrored by decreasing housing wealth holdings. 
In the developing Mediterranean regime, decreasing homeownership rates among the lowest 
occupational class, are mirrored by increasing housing wealth holdings. Stronger evidence can be 
found in a cross-cohort comparison in the liberal expansion regime (Denmark, Sweden, the 
Netherlands). This is the only regime where lower-class households in the youngest cohort are 
substantially more likely to own a home than their older counterparts due to the relaxed housing 
finance criteria. However, their housing wealth holdings are substantially lower. The liberalization 
of housing finance created a new group of precarious homeowners, with larger mortgage debts. In 
all housing wealth accumulation regimes, expect the developing privatisation regime, residential 
debts display an enormous increase. Especially in the restricted rental- and liberal expansion regime, 
debts doubled between the between the 1930-1959 and the 1950-1962 birth cohort (to maximally 
43% of the housing value). The fact that lower- and middle-class households face difficulties in 
amortising their mortgage, even in later life, enlarges housing wealth inequalities. 
 Our results however suggest that there are mechanisms that moderate the association 
between tenure inequality and housing wealth inequality. State involvement in the housing market 
seems to have led to relatively small housing wealth inequalities among the 1930-1949 birth cohort 
in the developing privatisation regime and the liberal expansion regime. For the developing 
privatisation regime (Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), we argue that the link between the 
labour market income and housing consumption was weakened under communism because the 
(semi-) public sector allocated housing especially according to ideological loyalty rather that 
occupational background. For the liberal expansion regime (Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands), we 
argue that especially the social-democratic governments in the Nordic countries weakened the link 
between the labour market income and housing consumption by the provision of subsidised 
homeownership. The 1950-1962 cohort, of which a large share entered the housing market after the 
fall of communism in the developing privatisation regime, or after the liberalisation of housing 
finance in the liberal expansion regime, display far larger housing wealth inequalities. In the 
developing Mediterranean regime (Italy, Spain, Portugal), we find another mechanism that 
moderates the association between tenure inequality and housing wealth inequality. Housing wealth 
inequalities are similar to those in the less familialistic, regulated expansion regime with lower 
homeownership rates. Furthermore, the relative position of the lowest occupational class in the 
1950-1962 cohort is better than in any other cohort. We speculate that the larger role of the family 
in the allocation of housing has as a consequence that the link between labour market income and 
housing consumption is weaker than when obtaining a mortgage is the usual route to 
homeownership. In the developing Mediterranean regime, housing is often inherited or, in the case 
of the oldest cohort, self-built.  
 To conclude, in market-based housing wealth accumulation regimes, the expansion of 
homeownership leads to an increase of housing wealth inequalities. As a consequence, attempts to 
encourage lower-class households to enter homeownership do not always improve their position in 
the socioeconomic stratification system since they accumulate less housing wealth than their higher-
class counterparts. At the same time, we find that a less marketised expansion of homeownership 
(e.g. a large role of the state or the family in the production and allocation of housing), potentially 
mitigates housing wealth inequalities among occupational classes. 
To grasp in more detail how housing wealth inequalities are shaped, further research should 
overcome at least three shortcomings of our study. First, it is important to broaden the scope to 
younger birth cohorts. With the current data we are not able to grasp the effects of housing finance 
liberalisation on the group that is arguably affected most by it. Among younger generations, the 
combination of innovative mortgage products and negative price developments have had more 
detrimental effects than among the population of this study. Second, we only took into account 
housing wealth due to data limitations, whereas its impact on stratification can only be estimated by 
including financial wealth in the analysis.  Yet, small housing wealth holdings can be complemented 
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by large financial wealth holdings. Finally, we have only elaborated upon the link between 
occupational class and the accumulation of housing wealth, whereas the demand on the housing 
market is even more shaped by life course events, the possibilities for pooling incomes and housing 
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Mediterranean Low 85% 83% 87% 77% 74% 80% 77% 73% 80% 90% 84% 95% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Middle 86% 84% 88% 84% 82% 87% 102% 97% 107% 92% 88% 97% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  High 94% 92% 96% 90% 88% 92% 117% 111% 124% 127% 121% 133% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  
Self-
employed 83% 80% 85% 86% 83% 89% 113% 106% 120% 110% 104% 116% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Developing 
privatization Low 73% 70% 75% 74% 71% 77% 104% 96% 113% 86% 78% 94% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  Middle 78% 76% 80% 83% 81% 85% 96% 91% 101% 101% 96% 105% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  High 86% 85% 88% 91% 89% 92% 111% 105% 117% 104% 99% 110% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  
Self-
employed 65% 60% 71% 90% 88% 93% 100% 89% 112% 100% 93% 106% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Restricted rental Low 34% 31% 37% 35% 32% 39% 84% 77% 91% 70% 61% 78% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 
  Middle 58% 56% 60% 63% 61% 65% 101% 98% 103% 83% 81% 86% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
  High 72% 70% 74% 80% 78% 82% 112% 109% 115% 105% 102% 109% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 
  
Self-
employed 66% 62% 69% 66% 63% 69% 130% 125% 134% 123% 119% 127% 1% 0% 1% 2% 1% 2% 
Regulated expansion Low 67% 64% 70% 66% 62% 70% 66% 62% 70% 66% 62% 71% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
  Middle 80% 77% 82% 75% 72% 77% 93% 90% 97% 82% 79% 85% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 2% 
  High 88% 86% 90% 85% 83% 87% 124% 120% 128% 108% 105% 111% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 2% 
  
Self-
employed 86% 82% 89% 89% 86% 91% 120% 114% 127% 117% 111% 123% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 3% 
Liberal expansion Low 45% 39% 50% 57% 50% 65% 108% 68% 148% 73% 40% 105% 7% 6% 9% 18% 15% 21% 
  Middle 64% 61% 67% 75% 72% 78% 92% 77% 108% 88% 64% 113% 10% 9% 10% 17% 16% 18% 
  High 79% 76% 81% 86% 84% 88% 109% 93% 126% 96% 86% 106% 14% 13% 15% 21% 20% 22% 
  
Self-
employed 84% 80% 87% 89% 86% 93% 132% 118% 147% 137% 116% 157% 13% 11% 14% 22% 19% 24% 
 
Table 2: Homeownership rates, housing wealth holdings and residential debts of occupational classes in two cohorts, in different housing wealth 
accumulation regimes. Source: Share wave 2,3,4 (own computation). 
 
 
